Queer mad animals
Foucault, eco-psychology and the de-humanised subject
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Abstract
This paper reviews the eco-psychological field in the contexts of recent queer ecological work, and of Foucault’s *History of madness*. I propose that psychology’s normative presuppositions about ‘nature’ and ‘human nature’ could constrain its capacity for ecological application unless self-reflexive, critical or queer theoretical approaches are applied. Morton’s and Mortimer-Sandilands’s queer ecologies use Butlerian notions of ‘gender melancholy’ to suggest a human subjectivity characterised by foreclosed ‘environmental melancholy’. This is considered in the light of Lynne Huffer’s claim that Butlerian queer theory’s reliance on ‘psychoanalytic Foucauldianism’ is based on a misreading of Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis. Whilst sympathetic to Huffer’s view that psychoanalysis institutes psychic interiority through self surveillance, I conclude that she doesn’t adequately account for Foucault’s theorisation of resistance to power, which was evident within psychoanalytic discourse from the outset. Further, I argue that *History of madness* not only traces the coming into being of the modern psychologised subject, but also reveals a history of animality through the shifting conceptions of the sexual, the bestial and the natural. The mad and the sexually deviant, initially equated with animals at the time of the great confinement, were later, through the instatement of psychological treatment regimes, associated with specifically human psychopathologies. I conclude that the ejection of animality from madness was coterminous with the coming into being of *human* interiorised subjectivity, and that psychoanalysis constructed the Freudian heteronormative human family at the site of the primal scene, through the exclusion of meanings relating to nonhuman others.

Keywords: Foucault, eco-psychology, subjectivity, animality
Scene of encounter

I begin by explaining my hyphenation of eco-psychology in this piece. Thinking about the queer(y)ing of ‘ecopsychotherapy’ I found myself wanting to separate the eco from the psychology; their being conjoined in this way perhaps camouflaging a gap; prematurely closing the space between eco – from the Greek for ‘house’, and psyche – from the Greek for ‘life’, or ‘breath’, (in Latin, ‘animalis’). I hope that preserving a space within this ‘life-house’ will allow something of their separate trajectories and histories to emerge, as well as the potentialities that arise from this meeting of eco and psyche. I admit that I am perhaps also fearful here for the fate of the ‘eco’ half of the partnership; having recently become reacquainted with Foucault’s *History of madness*, via Lynne Huffer’s meticulous reading in *Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the foundations of Queer Theory* (2010), I am feeling rather attuned to her resolute view that psychology is a particularly pernicious, modern and all too human affair, amounting – from a Foucauldian viewpoint – to the fulfilment of a progressively more imprisoning dominance of reason over unreason, through which the ‘self’ has been brought forth. For Foucault this was a project of morality, initiated by the great confinement of the mad in the classical age and culminating in the discourses of psychology and psychoanalysis which have produced sexualised and psychically interiorised human subjects.

In this piece I hope to sketch some zones of intersectionality between ecology and psychology and to suggest that the concerns of queer theory, and the recent advent of queer ecologies, illuminate the terrain of such a meeting, and query the sustainability of eco-psychology unless the critique of normalisation at the heart of queer theorising is applied self-reflexively within eco-psychological theories and practices. Of particular relevance here is the queer adoption of psychoanalysis, creating a zone of commonality with psychoanalytically derived eco-psychologies, especially given the recent deployment of psychoanalysis within ‘queer ecologies’ (Mortimer-Sandilands, 2010; Morton, 2010). Queer theories and ecologies are themselves also brought into question through Huffer’s dispute with ‘psychoanalytic Foucauldianism’ which she proposes is founded upon an incomplete reading of Foucault, creating a dilution of his views on the position of psychoanalysis, initially and extensively articulated in *History of madness*. She argues that this widespread misreading has led to the deployment of Freudo (Lacanian)-Foucault hybrids within queer theorisations of subjectivity and identity.
I will evaluate the significance of Huffer’s critique for the proliferating psychologies of queer psychoanalysis, psychoanalytically inflected ecologies and eco-psychology, but also supplement her account of madness’ history with some observations on the associated history of animality in psychologising discourse. The work of Judith Butler is also of particular significance here, in terms not just of its centrality to queer theory’s identity critique but also of its subsequent application within Morton’s and Mortimer-Sandilands’ queer ecologies. Further, her account of the psychically-constituted heteronormative subject is a singled out for particular criticism by Huffer, who feels that Butler obscures the primary trajectories of Foucault’s work relating to the role of all psychology in the production of the human subject.

Eco-psychological perspectives, whilst representing diverse orientations in terms of the psycho-therapeutic positions and practices from which they arise, are in fact largely psychoanalytically derived. Indeed, until very recently, much eco-psychology involved the direct transposition of pre-existing models of psychic structure, such as Kleinian (e.g., Weintrobe, 2010), or Attachment (e.g., Jordan, 2009), adhered to by the author in their clinical practice, onto various ‘ecological’ fields of concern, ranging from the question of apathetic attitudes towards climate changes and experiences of alienation from ‘nature’ to the newly invented ‘nature deficit disorder’ (Louv, 2011). Often these transpositions have been made without questioning the inherent suitability of the (usually) clinically derived concepts for application onto the social field, or without reference to the history of attempts to apply psychoanalysis to culture. This can be explained in part by the differences between the institutional or clinical contexts of the talking therapies and academy-based applications of psychoanalytic theory. Further, there is an activist base amongst practitioners, creating an imperative to ‘do something’; to apply knowledge and experience for the environmentalist cause of mitigating the effects of climate change and/or the eco-psychological aim of alleviating human alienation from ‘nature’. As I have discussed elsewhere (Young, 2012), ecopsychology has not, until very recently at least, preoccupied itself with questions about what is meant by the idea of ‘nature’ in discourses of ecology and environmentalism. Indeed, Tim Morton in his book about the notion of nature characterises “ecopsychology, pioneered by Theodore Roszak” as “a form of romantic ecology” (Morton, 2007: 185).
However, since this issue has become subject to critical attention from environmentally-oriented scholars in the humanities, eco-psychological authors have begun to question whether we can assume we know what is meant by the term ‘nature’ and, following Morton, to question whether ‘nature’ can any longer be said to exist. So having taken for granted the notions of both ‘nature’ and ‘human nature’, as a priori known and/or knowable categories, Morton’s propositions regarding the illusory character of such delineations have now begun to permeate the eco-psychological field (Dodds, 2010; Jordan, 2012). Bringing together queer theorising and eco-psychology creates an encounter with even greater combustive potential than Morton’s staging of a meeting between queer theory and ecology; a meeting which he characterises as both a “fantastic explosion” and a “pervasive Frankensteinian meme splice” (2010b: 273). The striking contrast here with Paul Hoggett’s view that we need to establish new categories of psychopathology, due to the cultural ‘perversity’ which gives rise to climate change denial (2009; 2012), exposes the polarisation between a normative eco-psychology produced through the lens of the psycho-pathologising Anglo-American psychoanalytic clinic, and the celebration of queer ecological perversity emanating from the humanities (or post-humanities) of the American academy.

Eco-psychology is, however, a young and diverse field, as demonstrated by some of the papers in the 2012 anthology Vital Signs (Rust & Totton, 2012), which express a desire to engage with postmodernism. Others are attempting to forge new approaches to eco-psychological practice, some of which challenge established notions of clinical space and therapeutic boundaries. These authors propose, for example, out-of-doors practices and work with nonhumans (Jordan & Marshall, 2010; Kerr & Key, 2012; Hall, 2102; Totton, 2010). By contesting the boundaries which physically constitute the psychotherapeutic frame, they present a challenge to the normalising power relations that structure the therapist/analyst/doctor to patent/client relationships which are central to the concerns of queer theory. However, without self-reflexivity in relation to the application of existing psychological concepts and models to ecological concerns, it may prove impossible to prevent the formation of new normalisations, as the example of Hoggett’s enthusiasm for expanding the classificatory arsenal to include eco-psycho-pathology suggests.

Eco-psychology appears to have contained from its inception a tension with regard
to the normalising inherent to psychology on the one hand and its environmentalist aspirations on the other. Roszak, in his 1994 proposal for the development of eco-psychology, argued that psycho-therapists were too focussed on interpretative strategies relating to sexuality or childhood, to the detriment of ecological meanings relating to experiences of alienation from the environment (1995: 2–3). However, at the same time he suggests that ecologically-based definitions of ‘mental health’ be developed, revealing that his challenge to the conventions of urban- and human-oriented psycho-practices does not extend to questioning whether classificatory pathologies of (human) mental health themselves might be part of the problem.

The question of developing a critical eco-psychological account of nonhumans is of particular relevance in terms of ‘queering the human’ as category, to which end I will address the shifting conceptions of animality and bestiality which, I will argue, have come to constitute an obscuring of the relation to nonhumans within the psychological field. When the deviant and mad were confined in the period prior to the development of knowledges about and treatments for madness, the mad were seen as indistinguishable from animals – their animality being synonymous with their madness and this ‘bestiality’ being the signifier of uncontrollably raging, violent and/or sexually depraved natures, as well as their possessing the then perceived physical characteristics of animality which included an immunity to feeling hunger or cold (Foucault, 2006: 145-8). However, by the time Freud (1918) was constructing the source of repression at the site of the wolf man’s primal scene in the early twentieth century, animals, rather than being synonymous with madness and deviancy, were all but excluded, interpreted away as signifiers of human sexuality, a mere foil for the construction of the oedipalised family and its disavowed incestuous impulses.

Deleuze and Guattari, in their account of Freud’s ‘Wolf Man’ case, argue that when Freud assumes that animals are signifiers of the parental sexual scene he cements the anthropocentrism of psychoanalysis, through an obsession with establishing the law of the castrating oedipal father, which they scathingly characterise as Freud demonstrating a ‘genius for brushing up against the truth and passing it by’ (1987: 30). In relation to his patient’s terrifying dream of gazing white wolves, likened by Deleuze and Guattari to ‘anti-oedipal hybrids’, Freud’s interpretative trajectory explains every element in terms of incestuous oedipal anxieties, which – they argue
– signifies Freud’s inability to developing a ‘truly zoological vision’ in which the
there is a recognition of nonhuman multiplicities. This is despite, as Genosko
notes, Freud’s repeated concern with the symbolism of the animal ‘other’ in
psychoanalysis (1993: 608-10).

We shall later examine in more detail the significance of Freud’s treatment of this
case in the context of the history of psychology’s exclusions of the nonhuman, and
of the reclamation of Foucault’s early work for our project of queer psycho-
environmental theorising. It is worth noting here though that while Foucault, unlike
Deleuze and Guattari, did not specifically situate psychoanalysis in an ecological
context, in his 1972 preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s first volume of Anti–
Oedipus he is particularly uncompromising with reference to psychoanalysis’
limitations, arguing that it ‘would subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the
twofold law of structure and lack’ (Foucault in Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: xiv). He
proposes that limiting binaries be cast aside in favour of ‘multiplicities’ and
‘mobility’.

It is striking that Foucault, in particularly expressive mood here, speaks in terms
not dissimilar to those of Tim Morton, who also critiques the effects of binary
thinking, specifically in relation to the artificial delineations that re-iterate the
fantasmic notions of ‘nature’, ‘environment’ and ‘the animal’. While animality
seems largely incidental to Huffer’s Foucauldian treatise, I will propose that the
fragments of a genealogy of animality revealed in Foucault’s History Of madness
suggest that psychologised human subjectivity cannot be disengaged from the
exclusionary delineations that came to define our relation with nonhuman others.

**Foucault’s unnatural ecology**

Neil Levy wrote a piece in 1999 entitled “Foucault’s unnatural ecology” which
addressed the intersection between environmentalism and poststructuralism, of
which eco-psychology and queer theory respectively can be seen as offspring.
Levy illuminates the terrain upon which a meeting of queer theory and eco-
psychology might take place, and at the same time suggests a Foucauldian
perspective which addresses, at least in part, the problematic that such an
encounter throws up. He notes the position of environmentalist idealism, which can
conceive of nature as either unsullied and pure or – as it increasingly has been
conceived of late, I would suggest – as sullied and tragically damaged. He then
goes on to outline the contrasting critical theoretical view, following Soper, that constructions of both ‘nature’ and ‘human nature’ act as positions utilised in the legitimisation of normalising practices (Levy: 203). Following Foucault’s account in *History of Sexuality* 1 of the appearance in the nineteenth century of the homosexual as a ‘species’, Levy notes that this ‘naturalisation' allows the constitution of perverse individuals as categories of the natural because they have been ‘discovered’ rather than ‘constructed’ (Levy: 205). He contextualises the production of sexualities as a form of biopower; the technologies which intervene at the level of population to develop “a form of power which operates on life itself … that endeavours to administer, optimise and multiply …subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulation” (Foucault in Levy: 211). Power intervenes within all members of a population – but what, ecologically, does a population consist of? If it is impossible to demarcate life from non-life, and if some life exists, or is made, in order to sustain other life, then these processes surely also come within the sphere of biopower’s regulatory discourse, and the notion of population should thus extend to the multiplicity of nonhumans. As Levy notes, it is the nonhuman as much as the human who has “entered into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques … [and] passed into knowledge’s field of control and power’s sphere of intervention” (Foucault in Levy: 211).

**Psychoanalysis and queer ecologies**

Tim Morton, in his critique of how humans construct ‘nature’, argues that fantasmic conceptions of ‘nature’ as a separate, often idealised othered entity are preventing us from “thinking ecologically”. Further, he argues that the human/nonhuman duality is also artificial, rendering ‘nature’ unsustainable as a construct when the presumed divide separating human from nonhuman is recognised as illusory (Morton, 2007, 2010a). Idealisations of nature impede the capacity to think ecologically because all constructions of nature as ‘other’ set up non-existent boundaries. Morton notes that even the boundary between life and non-life is blurred, and thick with ‘paradoxical entities’ (Morton, 2010b: 276). Creating artificial boundaries which form categories of ‘the natural’ functions as normalisation, by also constructing that which deviates from the natural. Further, these delineations prevent us from dealing with the real and multiplying effects of all of the collisionary interrelatednesses of life forms, which include the virtually
incalculable ecological complexities arising from anthropogenic global warming (Morton, 2010b: 274-5).

Morton’s work operates as a critique of romanticism and idealism, and thus also of eco-psychology inasmuch as it has been heavily invested in both modes of thought. So wherever it idealises or conceives of nature as ‘other’, eco-psychology undermines its own aims of healing alienation from ‘nature’ and trying to deal with environmental damage; its own presuppositions actually reinforce that which it seeks to undermine.

The contestation of categories of the natural, which has from the outset been a central concern for queer theory, also matters for the psychological field as a whole since it queries the integrity of a human subjectivity which only arises in relation to the fantastic separate other of nature. Following Judith Butler’s conception of foreclosed homosexual attachment resulting in ‘gender melancholy’, Morton speculates that subjectivity is structured by an environmental melancholy caused by unimaginable and ungrievable loss because the environment actually is that from which we can never be separate. This is a ‘dark ecology’, a ‘melancholic ethics’, which conceives of melancholy as an introjected and ‘irreducible’ component of subjectivity, saturated with unrequited longing for that we never had, because subjectivity itself is structured as radically separated (Morton, 2007:186).

Morton is here specifically drawing on Butler’s account of the psychic constitution of the human subject, which she feels addresses a lack in Foucault’s account of the subject’s coming to be as an effect of normalising discourses of sexuality, heath, medicine and the human sciences – in all of which psychology is deeply implicated. And Butler’s work, along with that of others who have similarly engaged with both psychoanalytic and Foucauldian ideas, is some of the most influential in queer theory. So it not surprising that recent critical and queer ecological accounts, which perhaps offer particular potential in the queering of eco-psychology, use Butlerian conceptions of melancholic psychic construction.

Mortimer-Sandilands uses both Freud and Butler to forge a queer ecology which argues that homosexual and environmental loss are bound together and foreclosed together. Like Morton she evokes melancholy as environmental as well as queer ethic. For Mortimer-Sandilands internalised melancholy is precious – for it holds the tracks and traces of losses and separations. Emerging from the devastation of AIDS, queer culture reveals a politicised understanding of a melancholia that
refuses pathologisation, expressed for example in Derek Jarman’s tenacious attachment towards lost beloveds. She describes his garden as a site for a “specifically queer” acts of memory, with nature not overwritten as wilderness but constituting, from its windswept shingle, a barren and unlikely refuge, shadowed by the Dungeness nuclear power station, a site “for extraordinary reflection of life, beauty and community” (Mortimer-Sandilands, 2010: 343-4). This is in stark contrast to what she sees as the commodification of nature in forms of eco-consumerism, which includes environmental destruction itself having become commodified in the form of dramatic broadcasts staging the losses of nature couched in pseudo-objective environmentalist-scientific terms, yet producing scopically fetishised human consumers who are ‘poised to watch’ the destruction (Mortimer-Sandilands, 2010: 333-340).

Mortimer-Sandilands’ trajectory, like those of Morton and Butler derives, from a non-pathologising interpretation of certain aspects of Freud’s thought, epitomised in Three Essays in which he asserts that “No healthy person … can fail to make some addition that might be called perverse to the normal sexual aim; and the universality of this finding is in itself enough to show how inappropriate it is to use the word perversion as a term of reproach” (1905: 160). She also emphasises the aspect of Freud’s work on mourning that suggests acceptance rather than treatment (Freud 1915). Although many have focussed on Freud’s proposal that incomplete mourning can become an ‘abnormal’ melancholia (Freud 1917), Mortimer-Sandilands opposes those who propose ‘progressive’ conceptions of mourning involving temporally situated ‘stages’ leading to resolution, or ‘moving on’, and takes up Freud’s lesser-known suggestion that it may not be possible to recover from some losses (Mortimer-Sandilands, 2010: 334-6).

Her eco-melancholia emphasises the idea that profound loss should not, or need not ever be, recovered from but should be re-embraced again and again; when what is most precious is lost, why should one ever want to completely get over it? So this is a queered mourning, an eco-psychological practice which, through its context beyond the clinical frames of psycho-practices, establishes mourning as ethical practice; a psycho-politics of love and loss, where social marginalisation of queerness, and personal and environmental losses, are brought together within a language of the out-of-doors (Mortimer-Sandilands: 340).

Mortimer-Sandilands is poignantly anti-normalising in her vision of queer
mechanistic eco-psychological practice, and offers potentially productive convergences with eco-psychological narratives on loss that emphasise commemorative practices (e.g., Randall, 2005). Nonetheless she does turn to the language of psychopathology when making her cultural critique: while I am inclined to be sympathetic to her analysis of capitalism’s appropriation of ecological concerns, when she refers to the environmental consumer’s “scopic fetish” Mortimer-Sandilands lends legitimacy to a psychoanalytic categorisation which clearly contains – in Foucauldian terms – a form of moralising, and an implicit positing of a non-consumerist non-scopically-fetishistic norm. Paradoxically, this is precisely the sort of position she seeks to undermine in her queer melancholic ethic. Recalling the contradictoriness of Roszak’s vision for ecological psycho-therapies, it strikes me that one of the dangers in putting psychoanalysis to use in cultural critique is that it occupies a paradoxical position as a site of both resistance to and re-iteration of norms. Its critical analytical power can act seductively to those seeking to use it to develop antinormative critique, inadvertently rendering innovative contexts a field for psychological normalisations. The history of psychoanalysis reveals its location as a site of contestation; the struggle between resisting and normalising forces, evident from the outset in Freud’s relations with resistant hysterics, suggests that the subjects of psychoanalysis, whether analyst, analysand or cultural critique, may end up, as Foucault ironically notes, not with a promised ‘liberation’ but with a new set of delineations and category constructions which ever incline to the separation of deviancy from norm.

So what of Morton’s engagements with psychoanalysis? These are multiply and promiscuously interwoven with other trajectories from the spectrum of critical, aesthetic and philosophical thought that broadly characterise the post-humanities. Always tethered to ecological ontologies, there are endless uncanny replications, and concerns with place and time, which he applies in his critiques of human fantasmic categories relating to the separateness of ‘nature’, the ‘animal’, the ‘human’ and ‘the environment’. Morton’s references to psychoanalysis often relate to the uncanny character of ecological awareness, as a psychological dimension of ecology, particularly the propensity of the uncanny to reveal the psyche’s compulsion to repeat (2010a: 53-4). Morton locates the uncanny as that which has potential to disrupt our delusional views not just of ‘nature’, but also of ‘the present’, evoking here the endless replications of life forms, insistently and
uncannily undoing the present by simultaneously, and on an unimaginable scale, unmaking and remaking the past and the future (Morton, 2012: 8–10).

Morton’s account of what we think of as being on the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ links queer theory to ecology through the contestation of limits and boundaries; for Morton it is queer work to contest the borders of what is and isn’t life (2010b: 276–7). This also brings into question the notion of ‘the environment’ itself, which implies a bordered zone that it is possible to be outside of. This fails because it is impossible to be outside of everything; rather one is always simultaneously inside and out. This relates to the issue of psycho-therapeutically constructed ‘psychic space’, which is brought into question because psycho-practices construct a physically and temporally bounded ‘therapeutic space’, which effectively re-enacts the fantasies of separation between inner and outer, especially as that space is usually constructed as specifically exclusionary of ‘others’ of all kinds.

No Foucauldian as far as the psyche is concerned, Morton is happy with the language of the unconscious, repression and trauma (2010a, 2012). The suggestion of a place of psychic origin which produces constructions of the ‘othered’ environment is paradoxical here in the sense that it posits a kind of ‘inside’. However I am not sure that the manner of Morton’s incorporations and traversals of psychoanalysis represent an acceptance of the psychic in quite the way it is conceived of in psychoanalysis. Morton interrogates the boundary between psyche and place, and latterly between psyche, place and time (2012: 7–20). Indeed at moments it seems more like an exteriorised psychic geography, with experience of self and place becoming indissociable as what is ‘in here’ and ‘out there’ “fold and redouble and entangle and cross over themselves” (2007: 178).

Common to both Mortimer-Sandilands’ and Morton’s accounts is the idea that humans are ‘foreclosing’ their interconnected-ness with nonhumans and environment. Relying on Butler’s account of a psychic subjectivity characterised by foreclosure and disavowals which produce irreducible melancholy, Mortimer-Sandilands and - at least in part - Morton, reflect queer theory’s reliance on psychologised interiority, which is precisely the issue that concerns Lynne Huffer. For her, psychology and psychoanalysis are not tools for the analysis of the psyche, but rather vehicles for its constitution as an historical emergence.

Butler though has made no grand claims for her theory, describing it as speculative, the outcome of a desire to find ‘productive convergences’ between the
Foucauldian and the psychoanalytic subject (Butler, 1997: 138). However, her account has proved compelling, a fact attested to by its foundational status in queer theory and its continued application, including recently – as we have seen – in environmental critique. Here my concerns are with the implications of this specifically Butlerian take on the concept of foreclosure within the context of the psycho-ecological work discussed above. This is because, firstly, I intend to consider Huffer’s claim that psychology and psychoanalysis are constitutive, rather than descriptive, of normalising subjectivity. And secondly, following from this, I will propose that psychologising theories and practices are constitutive of a specifically and exclusionary human subjectivity which, I will argue, explains at least in part how and why the human separativity that Morton describes has arisen and persisted. In relation to foreclosure I will also suggest that Butler is not applying the term in a strictly psychoanalytic sense, but that the manner of her usage may actually render it more applicable in accounting for human separations in relation to the multiplicities of ‘not human’ others.

**What Butler said (an all too brief account!)**

Butler theorises the coming into being of the psychic human subject in the context of both Foucauldian conceptions of discourse¹, and Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis.

In her 1990 *Gender Trouble* and subsequent works (1993, 1997) Butler uses psychoanalysis to investigate the psychic operation of heteronormalising discourse as well as to suggest that psychoanalysis could be used in the subversion of normativity. She suggests that psychoanalysis operates both as a practice through

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¹ The term ‘discourse’ underwent revisions and was used in different contexts during the course of Foucault’s career. Butler’s usage derives primarily form Foucault’s later works, notably *Discipline and Punish* and *Sexuality I*. Broadly, she uses the term to denote the means through which power relations and regulatory practices produce speaking subjects. This includes the systems of rules and authorisations which operate through institutions and practices including legal, penal, educational, medical and welfare systems, as well as psychoanalysis and the whole psychological field. In *Sexuality I* Foucault says the following of discourse: “It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this very reason, we must conceive of discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform or stable...we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies” (Foucault, 1998: 100).
which the coming into being of the subject is ‘re-iterated’, and through which normative positions and hierarchies can be powerfully contested and disrupted (Butler, 1990: xxxiii).

Butler argues that heteronormative discourse produces the gender identities of masculine and feminine which give rise to ‘gender melancholy’. Using Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis to theorise how a subject produced through normalising discourses becomes *psychically* constituted, she observes that the taboo on incest marks the initiation of the repression of desire, presumably ‘into’ the ‘unconscious’ although she does not precisely specify this. She then proposes that because the taboo on incest is also – simultaneously – a taboo on same sex desire, the oedipal repressive injunction is central to a discursive practice producing heterosexuality and heteronormalised subjects (Butler, 1990: 78-89). So for Butler, inherent in the oedipally-derived taboo on incest is homosexual prohibition, which sets up binary identities of masculine and feminine which structure and regulate sexual aims. We become psychically melancholic because of the repudiation of homosexual attachment, leading to an internalised identification with an unnamable loss. Added to the displacements of culture, this produces an exclusionary heterosexual code, the melancholy of which permeates *both heterosexual and homosexual identifications* – as it delineates “the legitimate from the illegitimate, the speakable from the unspeakable” (Butler, 1990: 89).

Butler re-works the Freudian oedipal scene by disputing the incest prohibition as a foundational or ‘natural’ human given, because if it were so this would already presuppose an originary and exclusionary heterosexual desire. So she is saying that psychoanalytic oedipalisation is itself a normalising effect – of a heteronormative discourse of sexuality. This means that the foreclosed homosexual attachment, and its loss, remains always unacknowledged, and as it cannot be grieved it gives rise to a culture of “melancholy heterosexuality” which obscures “a domain of homosexuality understood as unlivable passion and ungrievable loss” (Butler 1997: 35). The Oedipus complex serves to prohibit the child’s familial heterosexual attachment as incest, but not to prohibit heterosexuality itself; thus Butler argues that heteronormativity is constructed by allowing heterosexual attachments beyond the oedipal family, whereas for homosexual attachments both the object of desire *and the desire itself* must be relinquished. Butler accepts Lacan’s theorisation of the human subject as irrevocably divided, through having been structured by the
prohibitive paternal law operating through the prohibition on incest, which allows entry into the symbolic register of linguistic signification. However, she sees this process of division and subjugation as an effect of the law rather than an ahistorical or immutable aspect of its operation; the latter having often been the basis of criticisms of Lacan. In Butler’s version of Lacan there is no prediscursive reality (1990: 74). She objects to the idea that there could be a law which always and in the same way secures the “borders of symbolic intelligibility”, and instead takes the view that the law is not fixed, rather it “congeals” (Butler 1993: 206-207). Effectively, viewing the Lacanian notion of a psychically-structuring paternal oedipal injunction through a Foucauldian lens enables her to see Lacanian psychoanalysis as representing a challenge to normalising disciplinary practices: “The rendition of Lacan that understands the prediscursive as an impossibility promises a critique that conceptualises the law as prohibitive and generative at once” (1990: 75).

Butler’s account has been subject to many criticisms, especially in relation to her use of psychoanalysis (e.g. Campbell, 2004). My account of her perspective and the debates it has generated is focused on the issues relating to the use of Butlerian notions to theorise queer ecologies, and the relevance of Huffer’s critique for the viability of Butler’s account of human subjectivity in relation to queered psychocologies. In particular, there are difficulties with Butler’s use of foreclosure in the positing of psychic interiority. Butler doesn’t explain how interiority itself comes into being, or by what processes the internalisations that constitute homosexual prohibitions psychically permeate the pre-oedipal infant or young child. While heterosexual prohibitions are for Butler internalised psychically through the incest taboo, her notion of a pre-existent pre-oedipal taboo on homosexual attachment, which constitutes Butlerian foreclosure, appears to be construed as a regulatory norm, denoting a Foucauldian discursive rather than a psychic construction. Rather than explaining the intra-psychic effects of foreclosure to account for the mechanisms by which discourse produces heteronormative subjects, she attempts to account for psychic internalisations by using Freud’s account of melancholic identifications, which leads to the incorporation within the psyche of the ‘disavowed’ lost object. However, the problem here is that there is a slippage between her use of the term ‘foreclosure’, which implies a radical inaccessibility, and Freud’s less absolute term ‘disavowal’, which is more akin to a denial leading to the repression into the unconscious of those losses too painful to acknowledge.
Repressed contents of the unconscious can become accessible; this is one of the primary aims of psychoanalysis. But foreclosure, according to Lacan – who introduced its psychoanalytic usage – is radically inaccessible. It denotes a repudiation of oedipal psychic structuring, beyond symbolisation, and constitutes a failure in the institution of repressive mechanisms; a failure which Lacan saw as initiating psychosis (Lacan, 1988: 42–44). The problem for Butler is that Lacanian foreclosure can never be pre-oedipal because it is always a radical refusal of oedipal psychic structuring.

However, the idea of a radically inaccessible foreclosure, notwithstanding its original Lacanian context, is nonetheless more apt than the notion of disavowal as an explanation of the radically separative human subjectivity that Morton proposes, in that it represents a kind of expulsion of that which lies beyond the ‘all too human’ Freudian oedipalisations and, perhaps through the lack of access to the realm of human linguistic signification, foreclosure can even be said to represent a form of resistance to the coming into being of the specifically human subject. In Butler’s conception, foreclosure is bound up with normalising discursive effects whose operations are entirely hidden from the subject through whom they manifest. Because foreclosure here represents a kind of hidden psychic deletion, rather than a repression into the psyche’s unconscious, it does not necessarily imply the instatement of psychic interiority. Neither does it preclude the discursive production of subjectivity being characterised by losses; as Morton has argued, our separativity is itself an “environmental melancholia”. And Huffer in her account of the history of interiorised subjectivation, suggests that it leaves an inaccessible and inarticulable residue which she characterises, here echoing Butler, as saturated with “unspeakable loss” (2006: 176).

Return to Foucault

Huffer argues that Foucault’s theorisation of the production of sexualities began with History of madness, and that the critique of psychoanalysis associated with History of sexuality I, was already fully articulated in Madness, in relation to which Sexuality I can be conceived of as a kind of supplement (2006: 20–2, 34–6). The lack of association of Madness with Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis is attributable partly to the unavailability of the whole of Madness in English until 2006, which had encouraged this misconstruing of Sexuality I (xii–xiv). Huffer
argues that Foucault’s work must be taken as a whole, and that viewed as such it renders the reading of his position as one which both critiques and supports psychoanalysis unsustainable, in that it misunderstands his thesis that psychoanalysis was pivotal in the production of the psychically interiorised subject. This process of subjectivation which had begun over 200 years before, with the great confinement of the mad, was the first mass social normalisation, representing “Reason’s confinement of Unreason”. It saw numerous categories of the undesirable, including the poor, the venereal and the sodimitical, being confined alongside the mad. Huffer describes the alterity of madness as establishing the social body through the creation of an exception (those confined as, and with, the mad) in relation to the normal “universal” of the non-mad (pp. 144–5).

This “tragic fall”, for Foucault, consists of madness being mastered through being “known” as the first figure of man’s objectification as truth (Foucault in Huffer p. 147). This truth was secured through the modern technique of psychological cures, with psychiatry coming into being with the “birth of a myth of a medical and objective recognition of madness, the production of knowledge, and the reorganisation of internment into a world of healing” (Foucault in Huffer, p. 147). With the focus of science on healing mental illness, knowledges developed that combined internment with the possibility of a cure. Foucault writes that for the first time “an idea is formulated that will weigh heavily on the history of psychiatry up until the psychoanalytic liberation” (Foucault in Huffer, p. 147). Through scientific and moral truth telling – from the asylum, to Charcot then to Freud; medicalised “caged freedom” gave way to the “liberated language of psychoanalysis” (pp. 147–9).

Huffer goes on to challenge what she sees as the unreflective amalgamations of Freud and Foucault, which she thinks have invisibly come to permeate queer theory. She believes that there has been a turning away from Foucault’s archival methodologies, which along with a collapsing of his “uniquely generative” work into Freudo-Lacanianism, lead her to conclude that queer theory has not properly digested Foucault’s consistent critique of psychoanalysis as articulated in History of madness. She accuses Butler in particular of effectively authorising psycho-practices whereby “disavowed truths” are uncovered (pp. 164–172). Explicating this further with reference to Rose, she stresses the seductive reversal in queered
psychoanalysis whereby that which is identified as pathological becomes a signifier of resistance: “The unconscious constantly reveals the failure of identity... there is no stability of sexual identity, no position for women (or for men) which is ever simply achieved”. This does not represent a deviancy from the norm; rather it is:

endlessly repeated and appears not only in the symptoms, but also in dreams, in slips of the tongue and in forms of sexual pleasure that are pushed to the sidelines of a norm ... There is a resistance to identity at the very heart of psychic life (Rose in Huffer, p. 175).

Huffer opposes the positing of an interiorised psyche that both constitutes the subject and at the same time destabilises it with an “unconscious that guarantees identity’s failure” (p. 175). She argues that the violence inherent to internalisation itself remains unacknowledged, and that the “other failure, the unspeakable loss that haunts Madness is more explicitly social and more deeply historical” than the symptoms and signs that characterise Butlerian identity failure. For Huffer psychoanalysis fails to account for that queerest from of radical alterity called madness (p. 176). She writes of Butler’s *Psychic life* that it:

does not attend to the historical cost of subjectivity itself [but rather] to the ‘injury’ of identity ... which produces political agency as a subject in the form of a ‘traumatic and productive iterability’... rather then attend to the ongoing injury that is subjectivity (p. 179).

Huffer’s complaint is that Butler uses a psychoanalytic account of the ubiquity of the failure of the subject to cohere as a stable identity as a springboard for a politics of resistance, as articulated in Butler’s theory of performativity, which Huffer believes both misreads and misrepresents Foucault. She argues that Foucault’s concern was with the psychologisation of the subject itself, and because this has become disguised, the opportunity to challenge subjectivity is being missed. For Huffer psychoanalysis, and Butler’s appropriation of it, seems to be almost, if not quite, beyond redemption. For although she views psychologising interiority as synonymous with normalisation, she does concede that resistance to psychoanalysis can only come from within psychoanalysis. And ultimately resistance is what concerns both Foucault and Butler (and presumably Huffer too).

Butler shares Foucault’s conception of discourse and power as multiply located, including within the subject, as well as in the institutions and practices which bring the subject into being, and thus for Butler psychoanalytic discourse contains within
itself the potential for resistance. The subjects of psychoanalysis are themselves the sites of resistance, even as psychoanalysis operates to instate their subjectivity. Huffer rejects Butler’s view of resistance in psychoanalysis due to its association with repressions that result from the failure of normalisations, on the grounds that this presupposes psychic interiority. For Butler these repressions act to generate symptoms which can reveal the traces of that which has been lost and allow resistances to – and subversions of – normative identities to arise. It is not inconsistent with Foucault’s view of resistance to suggest, as Butler does, that the human subject is not formed into a stable or static entity, but rather one whose becoming is ongoing, and re-iterated through discursive practices. Therefore psychic interiorisation itself can be seen as a transitory formation within which discursive resistance may arise. On this specific point Huffer fails to offer us her Foucauldian version of resistance to and within psychoanalytic discourse, even though for Foucault resistance is always present, and multiply located within any discourse. He writes that “resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power … points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network [and] there has never existed one kind of stable subjugation” (Foucault, 1990: 95–97). What is significant here for Huffer’s critique of psychoanalysis is that the instigation of the self monitoring interiorised subject does not for Foucault necessarily imply a closing down of the possibility of resistance to and within that subjectivation. Indeed, resistance to and within psychoanalysis was evident from the outset. Freud, in his early attempts at psychological treatments in the context of the doctor/patient couple, was repeatedly thwarted and resisted by his late nineteenth century hysterical patients up to and including the famous case of seventeen year old Dora, who can be seen as an initiator of a queer contestatory relation to psychoanalysis, and also arguably as one of its founders (Bernheimer & Kahane, 1990). This is not resistance as heroic struggle, but nor does the doctor always triumph, even though many times Freud’s wielding of patrician and medicalised power is both breathtaking and heartbreaking. But at other moments Freud himself is undone by the challenges, resistances and refusals of these women (Breuer & Freud, 1895; Freud, 1895, 1905). And Huffer herself acknowledges her own psychologised subjectivity even as her work is a monument of resistance to it. I suggest in this regard she shows that a queered eco-psychology can preserve the integrity of its queer trajectory by operating resistively to psychology, and I will further argue later that resistance to and within psychology is also necessitated by
its ecological constitution.

Huffer points to the irony, but also the specificity, of Foucault’s statement regarding the “psychoanalytic liberation” in that it was the pinnacle of psychology’s pervasive yet violent colonisation. Whilst I am deeply sympathetic to Huffer’s identification of subjectivation as violence, my ecological concern about her position relates to its scope: its implicit positing of Reason’s effects upon the ‘human’. My question here would be: Does Huffer believe that this is the extent of those upon whom this violence is visited? Even though *Madness* reveals an intimate and enduring relation between the excluded animal and bestial mad others, Huffer does not follow through the implication of the effects, beyond the human, of the production of psychologised subjects. This theme will be taken up in the remainder of this piece; calling forth resistance in the form of the excluded other of the “animal”.

**Animal trouble: Sexuality or bestiality?**

Tim Morton writes in *Ecology without nature* that he sometimes wonders whether the question of “animals” is actually the question, due to its having the power to radically disrupt:

> any idea of a single independent solid environment … the beings known as animals hover at the corner of the separation of inside and outside generated by the idea of world as a self-contained system. Strangely enough thinking in terms of ‘world’ often excludes animals – beings who actually live there (Morton, 2007: 98–9).

Decrying the term “animal” as disastrous, Morton argues that the notion is artifice, because in addition to the separation and elevation of the human in relation to nonhuman others, it supposes an erroneous distinction at the boundaries of what is and isn’t life, which he likens to the binary coupling of norm versus pathological deviant that it has been queer theory’s business to undermine. He suggests therefore that queer theory can bring notions of “politcized intimacy” to the queering of ecology so that the human becomes “humiliated”. Such intimacy necessitates “thinking and practicing weakness rather than mastery, fragmentariness rather than holism” (Morton, 2010b: 276–278).

Morton and Mortimer-Sandilands both want to expand the borders of Butlerian theory to include that which is beyond the human, and indeed Morton here directly
equates a queered ecology with Humiliation, suggesting a subversion which my proposal below for “de-humanisation” echoes. Despite their identifying the fallacious assumptions of human exceptionalism, insofar as their queer psychologising rests on a specifically human psyche it remains problematic, not just in terms of positing an interiority, as Huffer charges, but also in the use of a psychology whose boundaries are exclusionary of the nonhuman. As we have seen, Huffer locates – following Foucault – the objects of psychology’s exclusions as being those denoted “mad”. But animality, like madness, has a history – which could reveal as much about the ‘human’ as about the ‘animal’ were a genealogy of the term to be undertaken. Here however I will concentrate on its specific construction in relation to psychologising theories and practices. For if we are to attempt to ‘ecologise’ psychology, we have to interrogate its borders; its inclusions and exclusions in relation to categories of the natural, as well as the forms taken by its subjectivations and confinements.

The conception of the ‘animal’ underwent a reversal as the great confinement was superseded by the ‘confined freedom’ that resulted from the development of knowledge about the mad. At the outset of the great confinement, madness was equated with animality and both were characterised as wild, violent, ‘bestial’ and in need of taming or training (Foucault, 2006: 148–9). Indeed, as Foucault recounts, the mad were kept in conditions almost identical to those of animals, and similar expectations were placed upon them and assumptions made about them: they were put to work in the manner of “beasts of burden” and presumed to be immune to illness (Foucault, 2006: 149). At this time the notion of ‘bestial’ could refer either to a nonhuman ‘beast’, or to humans having sex with animals. Bestiality in this latter sense was not distinguished from sodomy, which meant all non heterosexual penitative acts, and hence the association of madness and animality was further compounded by the association of the sexually depraved with animals. It is interesting to note that remnants of the association of animality with sex persisted; and can be seen some two hundred years later in Freud’s description of children’s perceptions of adult humans having sex “in the manner of beasts”, indicating that for Freud sexual acts signify a crossing point from being human to being animal (Freud, 1918: 41).

As confinement of the mad became “confined freedom” in the context of the initiation of treatments for madness as illness in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, notions of ‘nature’ as ‘wild’ were giving way to the idea of nature as ‘tamed’ and harmonious, and as a ‘place’ in which animals formed part of the ‘natural world’, conceived of as a source of rest, recuperation, peace and wholeness (Foucault, 2006: 373). This romanticised ‘othering’ of nature was equated with the ideals of reason and health, and was normalising especially in relation to women who were associated in their true ‘natures’ with the pastoral (Foucault, 2006: 370–1). These shifting conceptions of a peaceful othered ‘nature’ belied the significant changes that were underway in the organisation and mass exploitation of the constituent parts of this “whole nature”: the industrialisation of the natural and the nonhuman, with all of its ensuing and dramatic effects on life forms, including on the fortunes of ‘wild’ nonhuman ‘animal’ beings, (e.g., wolves, bears, birds), as well as on those billions who became intensively farmed.

It is striking that the mass confinement of the mad in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while unprecedented, was followed by the initiation of the mass containment and confinements of nonhuman ‘animals’ on a even greater scale in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While human control and domestication of animals had existed for at least ten thousand years (see for example Bruford et al, 2003), the past two hundred years have been characterised by an extraordinary biological and organisational intensification of the production, reproduction and exploitation of nonhumans. Foucault’s account of the institutionalised processing of the living, in the form of human prisoners (1991), has informed recent Foucault scholarship on animal confinement as a biopolitical relation which connects the mass-scale confinement of humans by humans with that of nonhumans by humans (Cole, 2010; Thierman, 2011). My focus here, however, is specifically on the discursive context – including the biopolitical implications – of psychology’s trajectory in relation to the figuring of animality. The establishment of psychology as a disciplinary discourse which initiated treatment regimes for the mad and deviant necessitated the ejection from madness of all of its former meanings associated with animality. The fragments of a genealogy of animality which can be traced through History of madness thus reveal psychology’s instatement of madness as a category of the specifically human and its simultaneous deletion of the equation of madness and animality. Further, the more subdued and idealised nineteenth century characterisations of animality both supported the romanticised constructions of nature which Morton critiques, and disguised the realities of the increasingly industrial exploitation of animal bodies: in biopolitical terms the great
confinement of the nonhuman.

Psychology’s exclusion of animality not only furthers the subjectivation of the human, but by disassociating ‘human-ity’ from ‘animality’ it contributes to a biopolitical discourse which legitimises and takes for granted a mastery of the nonhuman characterised by institutionalised and industrial instrumentality. Psychoanalysis is further implicated in the delineation of separative human subjectivity through the ascription within its theoretical constructs of particular psychic characteristics to the human, from which nonhumans are excluded.

The calling forth of the ‘animal mad’ and their subsequent deletion in psychologising theory suggests that Foucault’s critique of the modern psychologised subject also implies a critique of the modern and specifically human subject. Further, if discourses of sexuality as biopolitical regulatory forces are refigured in terms of a biopower that simultaneously summons into being populations of specifically human subjects, and produces, excludes and confines populations of nonhuman others, the non-subjects, then the study of biopolitics must surely include the effects of biopower on the interrelationships of all life forms.

Huffer makes the case that Foucault’s identification of the homosexual as a ‘species’ in *Sexuality 1* does not imply that this first arose in the nineteenth century but was initiated at the time that those who were deemed sodomitical were confined with the mad, and were associated with animality. My argument however, is that the identification of the homosexual as specifically human relates to later demarcations of forms of animality, when medicine and psychology identified sexuality with what had previously been seen as bestial. The moment when the homosexual as a ‘species’ becomes human is thus marked by the specific identification of sodomy with the psychologised categorisations of sexuality rather than its former generic associations with bestial animality.

Psychology’s project of human/animal differentiation was, according to Derrida, also furthered by Lacan, who demarcates the human in terms of their alone having access to the ‘symbolic’ – the register of the linguistic. Lacan here instates the divide between the animal and the human by ascribing particular qualities only to the human, including those of speech, awareness of death, mourning, culture, lying, guilt, laughter and crying (Derrida, 2008: 134–5). By construing the human as linguistic and capable of symbolisation, Lacan confirms within psychoanalysis
the notion of the human specificity of the psychic interior. Derrida questions the assumption of ‘right’ by which Lacan, a human, can describe the qualities which a nonhuman lacks. Further, in doing so, ‘animals’ become denoted as a singular othered grouping; their almost unimaginably diverse range of differentiating attributes overlooked as they are, as a whole, those who are “other than human”. For Derrida this relegation of ‘the animals’ collectively is nothing short of a violence against ‘them’ and one which makes permissible the industrial, hormonal, genetic and chemical violences to which they have been increasingly subject for the past two centuries (Derrida, 2008: 26).

The argument here is that the psychic human has been “brought forth” through the positing of a non-interiorised ‘animal’ other, whose former union with the mad and the deviant needed to be expunged for psychology to complete humanised subjectivation. If we consider psychology as a discourse that normalises through exclusions then we can also reconceive of foreclosure in this context as representing an inassimilable exclusion, a negation, through which our separative and specifically human subjectivity is constructed. However, in terms of the history of psychoanalysis, this ultimately hinges not on Lacan’s symbolic register but on the Freudian oedipal moment, represented by the ‘primal scene’ that precipitates for Lacan, the entry to the symbolic order. The linguistic and associative binds that conflated, within psychoanalysis, the sexual with the bestial, and also the animal and the cannibal, have however proved difficult to completely unbind. And perhaps this was especially so for Freud, who associated the ‘animal’ with bestial sexuality even as he sought to separate them, as we shall see below, in his theory of incestuous oedipal desire. My thesis is that oedipalisation itself is a house of cards and, as Huffer says, part of psychology’s patrician progeny, but not only in the form of a heteronormatively conceived psyche policed by an oedipally structured psychoanalysis. The primal scene, the site on which this Freudian version of the oedipal drama is brought into being, has an ‘altern’ – a radically other construction – which represents a further challenge to psychoanalysis in terms of revealing its anthropocentrism, as well as representing a supplement to Foucault’s and Huffer’s construals of human psycho-normalising subjectivity. This alternative account re-calls the ‘animal’ other to the primal scene through the visions and dreams of a late nineteenth century Russian child – who was to become Freud’s famous patient – known as the ‘Wolf-Man’.

27
The humanisation of the primal scene

In his 1918 ‘Wolf-Man’ case Freud elaborates the operation of the Oedipus complex at the site of the ‘primal scene’, in which a child is faced with the traumatic sight of his parents engaged in sex. Freud retrospectively constructs this scene, never recounted by his patient, from a dream, which took place some 30 months after the time of the alleged primal scene. The dream, of an altogether other scene, reported by the adult patient as having taken place at age 4, consists of an image of several white wolves upon a walnut tree, looking in at the terrified child through his bedroom windows – which have uncannily opened of their own accord. The dream is systematically mapped by Freud onto an oedipal schema, whereby by all of its features, along with numerous nonhuman and fairy tale associations, are denuded of their beastly characteristics in favour of interpretations relating to the child’s incestuous longings and anxieties. Freud thus insists on inscribing the primal scene with the specifically human construction of the incest taboo, even though he knows that children identify with ‘animals’ (Freud in Genosko, 1993: 610), and that the wolf-man had seen adults having sex ‘in the manner’ of animals. Freud, rather than elaborating the apparently more obvious relations of sexuality and animality, manages, through a series of reversals – which are after all in psychoanalysis characteristic of how the unconscious works – to construct the oedipal heteronormative family at the site of the primal scene. It is as though Freud is compelled through oedipal inscription to erase from, and incorporate to, the human all traces of the presence of nonhuman otherness. In doing so he occludes the young Russian’s actual relations to wolvish others, as well as to multiple significations of the fairy tales and folk histories densely populated by boundary crossing encounters with wolves, and wolf human hybrids (Kelly, 2007; Young, 2012).

In psychoanalysis another human/animal hybrid emerged which better suited its purpose of demarcating the properly human psyche - that of the ‘primitive’. Primitivity haunts psychoanalysis; the concept is extensively used to denote a being or a psychic state that is neither human nor animal but lies somewhere in the middle. As well as implicit and explicit relegations of non-Western cultures, the notion of primitivity in psychoanalysis works conceptually to exclude the nonhuman other by ascribing qualities to a primitive human or primitive aspect of the psyche, whose proximity to animality necessitates this intermediate
designations. This further masks psychology’s artificial demarcation of human from animal, through primitivity becoming the receptacle for the ‘animal’ within the (sub)human. One of the human-ising functions of primitivity in Freud, visible particularly in Totem and taboo, is the ascription to the primitive individual of a lack of moral sensibility, denoted for instance by the retention of the capacity for cannibalism (Freud, 1913: 2–3).

For Freud, the establishing of oedipal norms requires the psychic installation of erotic transgressions. These of course include the transgression of sex with a nonhuman, evoked but then excluded by Freud in his account of children’s bestial perceptions of the primal scene. The figure of the domestic ‘pet’ – one of Haraway’s “companion species” (2003), which has recently been queered in conceptions of both erotic and companionship partnerings (e.g., Kuzniar, 2008) – serves to illustrate the fragility of human constructions of who is lovable, and who – or what – is killable and eatable. And as these taboos are neither confined exclusively to humans nor are humans entirely susceptible to either of them, they cannot in any case work in an absolute way to define the boundary of the human; they have points of failure or resistance, as the construction of primitivity demonstrates.

The privileging of the incest taboo both inscribes specifically human subjectivity through sexualised psychological discourse, and preserves forms of demarcation that support and disguise the biopolitical aims of the multiple forms of confinements of those ‘not human’ others, including the farmed, the displayed, the domesticated, the wild, the observed and recorded, the protected and the hunted. In relation to our contemporary ecological predicament this brings into question, as I speculated at the outset, the partnering of ecology and psychology, unless of course the terrain of the coupling can become sufficiently contestatory – in other words, queered in such a way that biopower’s discourse of psychology can become self-reflexively unmasking.

De-humanising eco-psychology

The exclusion of nonhumans, and the disguising of the confining positions to which these ‘others’ are consequently relegated, raises questions as to the trajectories of any ecological psychology. Thinking eco-psychology queerly requires nothing short of the subversion of our ‘human-ity’ – our de-humanisation.
We need to go further than Foucault’s subjectivation, to account for the subject as humanisation. Queer theory is well placed to theorise and imagine some of the contestatory boundary crossings that might enable us to de-humanise, to en-joint with our not human companions. Further, within Foucauldian queer scholarship, if biopower’s psychologising normativity is construed as applying to its discursive operation in relation not only to human populations, but to life forms as populations, it is properly the subject matter of de-humanised queer ecology. With regard to eco-psychology, its de-humanisation may yet be possible despite psychology’s trajectories being so thoroughly implicated in the normalising and exclusionary discourses of the human. Resistance to and within discourses will always arise, and if eco-psychology, already mounting challenges to the institutional and spatial contexts of the psycho-therapies, becomes further characterised by queered de-humanising boundary crossings and contestatory self-reflexive positions, then that which psychology subjectivates and humanises might be recovered; re-calling that the life and breath which is psyche to its ‘eco-house’.

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Queer mad animals


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